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Abstract 
Prior research indicates that the increase in help towards 1 identified victim (identifiable 
victim effect) is partly driven by affective reasoning. When negative affective information is 
salient, help towards victims that can be helped decline, an effect known as pseudoinefficacy. 
However, the affective component has not been clearly defined, and help efforts has been 
used interchangeably with measures of affect. In 2 studies, I measured 1. An affective 
component clearly defined as anticipated warm glow for hypothetically donating toward 
victims, 2. Help efforts (help intention and donation). The experiments manipulated victim 
stories and negative affective information in the form of victim statistics. Field experiments 
were conducted using pen-and-paper packages where participants rated humanitarian aid 
advertisements. Victim statistics caused lower help intention and anticipated warm glow for 
specifically 1 identified victim. However, these results were not replicated in the follow-up. 
The second study demonstrated lower donations for 1 identified victim presented with victim 
statistics. Anticipated warm glow had a slightly stronger relation to help intention and 
donations for specifically 1 identified victim compared to 9 statistical victims. Results 
indicate that evaluating the help efforts toward a victim is related to anticipated warm glow. 
Introducing victims that cannot be helped can lead to lower anticipated warm glow. 
Differences in anticipated warm glow might be one of the underlying factors for both 
pseudoinefficacy and the identifiable victim effect. 
 Keywords: identifiable victim effect, pseudoinefficacy, anticipated warm glow, 
proportion dominance, charitable aid, willingness to pay, help effects, anticipated emotion 
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When Knowing More About a Crisis Decreases Charitable Aid: Victim Statistics Causes 
Lower Anticipated Warm Glow and Help Efforts for Specifically Single Identifiable Victims. 
Millions of people are affected by crisis every year. On a global scale over 50 million 
humans are currently fleeing conflict, environmental disaster, famine, and disease. There is a 
great demand for humanitarian aid, and in 2013 a record amount of resources were 
redistributed. Governments contributed $16.4 billion, and private donations reached $5.6 
billion (Global humanitarian assistance, 2014). One of the current targets of humanitarian aid 
are the victims of the Syrian civil war. The UN reports great consequences for the civilian 
population, violations against children include bombing of schools, hospitals, and forced 
recruitment of child soldiers (UN Security Council, 2015). The seriousness of the 
humanitarian crisis in Syria is known to the world, yet only 65% of the UN appeals towards 
the conflict were funded in 2013 (Global humanitarian assistance, 2014). 
Since resources are limited, Governmental bodies and private donors are forced to 
make judgments of both the size of contributions and where to target the aid. These decisions 
are partially based on information about the victim; the way of presenting a victim is here 
referred to as a victim context. The following context is a victim story taken directly from 
Save the Children’s web page: 
 
11-year-old Ghofran hasn’t been to school for a year – even though she’s living in 
one. She enjoyed going to school in Syria, but conflict erupted and forced Ghofran 
and her family to leave their home and country, and flee to Lebanon. Now a refugee, 
Ghofran sleeps on the floor of an abandoned classroom, and hasn’t been to school in 
over a year. (Save the children, 2013) 
 
Ghofran is described using her name, age, and personal information, including where she is 
from, where she fled from, her current situation and ambitions. In comparison this media 
report presents a different context, victim statistics: 
 
Empty out Boston; starve Moscow, and you may understand some of Syria's hell. The 
death toll there has doubled in a year's time, if an opposition group is right. Since civil 
war broke out there, 310,000 people have been killed, the Syrian Observatory for 
Human Rights said Thursday. A year earlier, SOHR's tally stood at 162,402. And the 
year before, the United Nations put the death toll at 70,000. 
(Blumfield, 2015, Cnn.com) 
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When comparing Ghofran to one of the statistical victims reported by CNN, these victims are 
arguably perceived in different ways. The statistical victim with number 237.001 in the CNN 
article does not lend us many details compared to what we know about Ghofran. In the victim 
story about Ghofran no victim is outside the reach of help, and in the CNN victim statistics 
hundreds of thousands are already dead. The focus of this thesis is about how both 
information regarding Ghofran (victim story) and the victims reported by CNN (victim 
statistics) is impacting judgment about help efforts. When more victims of the Syrian civil 
war are salient, what is the impact for help efforts concerning Ghofran? 
Recent research demonstrates that help efforts decrease rapidly for small number of 
victims when other victims that cannot be helped are salient, something that is referred to as 
pseudoinefficacy (Västfjäll, Slovic & Mayorga, 2015). This thesis will build on the recent 
findings concerning pseudoinefficacy. I will demonstrate how exposure to victims that are 
out of reach impacts the anticipation of post-judgment emotion and help efforts with clear 
definitions for both possible underlying mechanisms and help efforts. This will be 
accomplished by systematically manipulating both types of victim contexts: 1. The victim 
story (i.e. Ghofran) where all the victims can be helped, and 2. Whether or not victim 
statistics (i.e. CNN statistics) with victims that cannot be helped are presented. 
Contexts where all victims can be helped 
One identified victim like Ghofran has an increased chance to receive donations 
compared to a victim without identifying information (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, b, 2007). This 
increase in contributions is related to presenting personal information about a victim (Sah & 
Loewenstein, 2012). When help efforts are increasing because of personal information, the 
increase is commonly referred to as the identifiable victim effect (Jenni & Loewenstein, 
1997). However, the victim stories that are compared do not need to be as extreme as the 
example in the introduction. An identified victim compared to a victim with the same amount 
of personal information, but not yet selected from a pool of victims elicited less hypothetical 
help compared to if the victim was already selected. A victim elicit increased help efforts by 
just being determined, a very weak form of identifiability. This also demonstrates that help 
efforts can increase incrementally with increasing identifying information (Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003). A similar increase in contributions has also been shown using the 
ultimatum game, where additional personal information of the recipient increased the sharing 
of resources (Bohnet & Frey, 1999).  
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Kogut and Ritov (2005b) found that the identifiable victim effect was absent when 
comparing groups of victims. When manipulating both identifiability (identified vs. 
unidentified) and victim number (1 victim vs. 8 victims) identifying information had no 
effect on donations for the groups of eight victims, it only had an effect when comparing one 
identified victim to statistical victims. The identifiable victim effect is constrained to single 
identified victims, something that is referred to as the singularity effect (Kogut & Ritov, 
2005a, b, 2007). This singularity effect was also observed by Redelmeier and Tversky 
(1990), physicians evaluated interventions and their cost for individual patients and patients 
in groups. Physicians were more willing to spend resources on expensive interventions for 
individual identified patients compared to identifiable individuals in a group of patients. 
Although there are theoretical and experimental separations of the identifiable victim 
effect and the singularity effect, in many experiments hybrids are used where the single 
victim is identified and compared to many, hundreds, or thousands of statistical victims 
(Friedrich & McGuire, 2010; Small, Loewenstein & Slovic, 2007). These kinds of studies 
used both identifiability and the singularity effect, and are arguably more similar to donation 
pleas outside the laboratory. 
Building on this research, the experiments used for this thesis will manipulate the 
victim story in three levels using humanitarian aid ads concerning victims of the current 
conflict in Syria; 1 identified victim that is pictured and presented with name and age, 9 
identified victims all pictured and named, and 9 statistical victims that were presented with 
silhouettes instead of pictures, question marks instead of names. The statistical victims were 
also undetermined, the participants read that their potential donation will reach nine children, 
but the victims are not yet determined. 
Contexts where all victims cannot be helped 
In the aforementioned studies primarily focused on the identifiable victim effect, all 
of the presented victims could be helped. For instance, Kogut and Ritov (2005) compared 
saving 1 identified victim to saving 8 identified victims. When facing donation pleas there is 
often additional statistical information or knowledge that describes humans at risk that cannot 
be helped. For example, statistical information about the conflict in Syria introduces 
thousands or even millions of victims for which help might be out of reach. 
In a series of experiments, Bartels (2006) demonstrated that saving a greater 
proportion of victims were preferred over absolute number of victims. When deciding 
between interventions that could possibly save 230 of 300 (76%) victims, compared to 230 of 
920 (25%) victims, the former intervention with the largest proportion was preferred by a 
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majority of participants. This preference for proportion as an evaluative basis for judgments 
compared to absolute numbers of victims is referred to as the proportion dominance effect 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters & Macgregor, 2007). This effect has been demonstrated many times 
and using varied scenarios (Fetherstonaugh, Slovic, Johnson and Friedrich 1997; Baron, 
1997; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). The effect is present when the units of interest are 
relatively hard to evaluate, one example of this is the importance of saving 230 lives in one 
camp compared to 230 lives in another camp (Fetherstonaugh et al., 1997). In addition, when 
the absolute victim number you can save is manipulated and participants are deciding 
between a project saving 225 of 300 (76%) victims or 230 of 920 (25.56%) victims, there is a 
preference for the former project with the largest proportion, even though fewer lives are 
saved (Bartels, 2006). 
A closely related construct to proportion dominance is pseudoinefficacy, a decrease in 
help efforts for victims when other victims that cannot be helped are salient (Västfjäll et al., 
2015). The term pseudoinefficacy denotes help efforts that are seen as inefficient when they 
infact are efficient, in other words pseudoinefficient. Whereas proportion dominance 
scenarios concerns larger amounts of victims, pseudoinefficacy is demonstrated using 
scenarios with small numbers and with less emphasis on proportional changes. Västfjäll, 
Slovic, Mayorga and Peters (2014) demonstrated this by presenting a plea for donations using 
two starving children. In one condition the participants indicated how much money they were 
willing to donate to one child. In the other condition participants were asked to select and 
donate towards one of two children, the other child will not get help. The victim presented 
together with a victim that could not be helped elicited 33% lower donation amounts. In 
comparison with proportion dominance were small proportions decrease help efforts; 
pseudoinefficacy is here shown for a larger proportion of victim helped (50% or 1 of 2 
victims). There are several experiments that demonstrate this decrease when victims that 
cannot be helped are present (Västfjäll et al., 2014, 2015; Small et al., 2007). Descriptively 
proportion dominance and pseudoinefficacy are quite similar, in both cases there is a 
preference for the largest proportion (1 of 1 victim or 100% compared to 1 of 2 victims or 
50%) but the hypothesized underlying causes are different. This is something I will address 
later in this thesis. 
Building on this research, the experiments in this thesis will as a second manipulation 
present half of the participants with statistical information that includes a large number of 
victims for which help is out of reach. 
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The interaction between victim stories and victim statistics 
The earlier two sections presented studies that used two different context types: 
victim stories (i.e. 1 identified victim, 9 statistical victims) where all victims can be helped 
and preferences are shown for identifiable victims and/or single victims compared to greater 
number of victims. The second context participants are facing victims that cannot be helped 
(i.e. victim statistics), and show preference for the greater proportion of victims compared to 
absolute numbers. In this section I will describe a study in more detail that manipulated both 
the victim story and victim statistics. 
In a series of experiments Small et al.,(2007) examined the impact of deliberation on 
the identifiable victim effect. In the first experiment participants received $5.00 for 
completing an unrelated survey. When the participants were paid, they also received an 
envelope and a letter soliciting for donations. The solicitation letter manipulated the victim 
stories. Half of the participants read a victim story about one identified victim: 
 
Any money that you donate will go to Rokia, a 7-year-old girl from Mali, Africa. 
Rokia is desperately poor, and faces a threat of severe hunger or even starvation. Her 
life will be changed for the better as a result of your financial gift. With your support, 
and the support of other caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with Rokia’s 
family and other members of the community to help feed her, provide her with 
education, as well as basic medical care and hygiene education. 
 
Whereas the other half read victim statistics: 
 
Food shortages in Malawi are affecting more than three million children. In Zambia, 
severe rainfall deficits have resulted in a 42 percent drop in maize production from 
2000. As a result, an estimated three million Zambians face hunger. Four million 
Angolans—one third of the population—have been forced to flee their homes. More 
than 11 million people in Ethiopia need immediate food assistance. 
 
In addition, half of the participants read about the identified victim effect hence 
forming a 2 (victim story vs. victim statistics) x 2 (knowledge about the identified victim 
effect vs. no knowledge) between-group design. After reading about the victims they could 
chose to donate any of the received $5.00 towards the victims. The identifiable victim effect 
was replicated in the groups without knowledge about the effect, however when participants 
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knew that help usually increases for one identified victim, the help decreased significantly for 
one identified victim. What is especially noteworthy here is that help did not increase for the 
statistical victims in the groups that knew about the identifiable victim effect, i.e. help 
towards statistical victims were unaffected by the manipulation. 
In the next experiment, three victim stories were used: 1 identified victim, statistical 
victims, and 1 identified victim + statistical victims. Again the identified victim effect was 
replicated, donations were higher for one identified victim. Interestingly, donations for one 
identified victim presented alongside statistics was only slightly higher than for the pure 
statistical victims. It is however clear that something happened to the evaluation of the 
identified victim that decreased donations when deliberating, or when participants also faced 
other statistical victims. One hypothesis was that deliberate thought decreased the 
dependence on affect for evaluating the one identified victim. A scale that measured self-
reported affective reactions was used with items such as: “How upsetting is this situation to 
you?” and “How touched were you by the situation described?”. These items had a slightly 
increased correlation with the one identified victim presented without the analytical thought 
interventions. The implications of this experiment is that when adding one identified victim 
to victim statistics help efforts increased slightly, in contrast when adding victim statistics to 
one identified victim help efforts decreased significantly. 
Although the article presented evidence for some sort of affective reasoning that 
causes the valuation of one identified victim to be lower, the exact affective construct the 
experiments tried to capture is unclear. The direction of valence is unclear, i.e. the question of 
how touched you were could be interpreted as either negative or positive in valence. In 
addition arguably more cognitively oriented questions like: “How much do you feel that it is 
your moral responsibility to help with this cause?” was mixed with affective items: “How 
upsetting is this situation for you?” The items produced a relatively high alpha value of .87. 
However, it is possible that this alpha value is reflecting demand effects and not actual 
reliability. 
In this thesis I aim to fill the gaps of these studies by: 1. Partially replicate their third 
experiment, but instead of using three conditions, my experiments will manipulate victims 
you can save (1 identified victim, 9 identified victims, and 9 statistical victims) and exposure 
to statistical information that includes victims you cannot save (statistics vs. no statistics). 
This will make it possible to examine if victim statistics have a different impact on help 
efforts depending on the victim/victims you can save in the victim story. In addition more 
reliable measures for possible underlying causes will be implemented. Until now I have 
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mostly discussed contextual differences in how victims can be presented and descriptive 
results of how different victim contexts impact help efforts, in the next section I will review 
proposed underlying causes of how victim contexts are evaluated. 
Explanations of the identified victim effect, singularity effect, proportion dominance, 
and pseudoinefficacy 
Many authors have argued for a greater emphasis on emotion in judgment and 
decision-making (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch, 2001) and in moral judgment 
(Haidt, 2000). Affect is broadly defined as a feeling or emotion ranging from extremely 
negative to extremely positive in valence, and varying in complexity (A.P.A. Dictionary of 
Psychology, 2006, p. 26). Västfjäll et al.,(2014) used a more narrow definition where affect is 
an emotional valuation of an experience, object, or behavior: “a feeling (not necessarily 
conscious) that something is good or bad”. In a similar way Finucane, Peters, & Slovic 
(2003) defines affect as experiencing a positive or negative quality of a stimulus with or 
without consciousness, were stimulus can refer to internal or external events and objects. This 
thesis uses the same definition of affect, with the additional note that the main interest here is 
valence and not arousal levels related to a certain stimulus. This distinction is important since 
affect defined this way does not make a distinction between cognitive or emotional 
evaluations; the focus of this thesis is how negative or positive stimulus is perceived 
regardless of the amount of deliberation or affective evaluation of quality. In this thesis the 
evaluated stimulus is anticipated post-decision emotion, something I will come back to in the 
section on anticipated emotion. 
Many underlying causes for the identified victim, and the singularity effect have been 
suggested. Among these suggestions are: helping a single individual has a more certain 
outcome and therefore a larger perceived impact (Cryder, Loewenstein & Scheines, 2012), a 
single individual is the largest possible proportion of victims helped (Jenni & Loewenstein, 
1997), or that the effects mainly are mediated by increased sympathy elicited by a single 
identified victim (Erlandsson, Björklund & Bäckström, 2014). Slovic (2007) suggested that 
evaluations of human life are reliant on positive or negative affect. Where the single 
identified victim carries an affective value that cannot be multiplied for victims in groups. 
This hypothetically causes a steady decrease in valuation for victims when their numbers 
increase. The same author and colleagues argue that when help efforts are valued using affect 
as information, help efforts for statistical victims become relatively lower. The statistical 
victims carry less affective value per person than the single identified victim (Slovic, et al., 
2007). Reading this research it is not always clear exact what stimulus that is related to a 
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certain affective value. In this thesis, when evaluating the importance of aid with the help of 
affect, the outcome of the judgment is carrying different affective values depending on victim 
type. In other words outcome plus victim is the evaluated stimulus. 
A strong relation between increased affect for one identified victim and increased 
donations for the same victim compared to statistical victims has been demonstrated. Kogut 
and Ritov (2007) measured self-reported negative affect elicited by the victims that followed 
a similar pattern as help efforts. Ratings of distress increased when the participants faced a 
single sick child compared to a group of sick children. And contributions towards expensive 
life-saving interventions were higher for the single identified victim. More evidence of 
evaluations based on affect comes from neuroimaging and electrophysiologic measurements. 
When donating to a child displayed with a photo was contrasted to a silhouette of a child, 
activity of the nucleus accumbens was related to increased donations (Genevsky, Västfjäll, 
Slovic & Knutson, 2013). Activity in this area is often related to approach behavior 
(Harbaugh, Mayr & Burghart, 2007). 
Affect seems to be higher for individual victims, but what is different about how 
single individuals are processed compared to groups? Hamilton and Sherman (1996) 
proposed a model where individuals are processed as coherent units and groups are processed 
on a relatively more abstract level. Groups are more diverse than individuals and according to 
the model we seek less coherence when processing groups. Individuals are however 
processed as coherent units, and will therefore be processed more extensively. This relatively 
more extensive processing can lead to stronger impressions, and increased affective 
processing. There is some experimental evidence supporting this notion, when a group of 
victims are presented as a coherent unit the measured self reported affect was at the same 
level as for one individual (Smith, Faro & Burson, 2013; Västfjäll et al., 2014). In addition 
individuals in groups are perceived as having less beliefs, desires, consciousness, and 
intelligence (Morewedge, Chandler, Smith, Schwarz & Schooler, 2013), something that is 
also backed up neuroimaging evidence in the form of more activation of mentalizing 
networks when processing behavior of an individual compared to an individual in a group 
(Van der Cruyssen, Heleven, Vandekerckhove & Overwalle, 2015).  
In contexts where there are victims that cannot be helped, perceived impact is one of 
the main candidates as an underlying cause. A high perceived impact of donations has also 
been directly linked to higher donation amounts (Cryder & Loewenstein, 2012; Gneezy, 
Gneezy, Nelson & Brown; 2010). When the proportion dominance effect is present 
(preference for helping 230 of 300 victims compared to 230 of 900 victims) helping the 
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largest proportion is perceived as being more impactful (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997) and in 
mediation analyses, perceived impact is the main mediator of the proportion dominance 
effect (Erlandsson et al., 2014; Erlandsson, Björklund & Bäckström, 2015). It is important to 
note that increased perceived impact does not exclude affective evaluations of help efforts. 
The decision to help in itself can be perceived as highly positive or negative depending on 
perceived impact. 
When victims receive less help because of a low impact or low perceived impact there 
is a risk for pseudoinefficacy, an intervention can be seen as being low in impact even though 
lives are saved. Västfjäll et al. (2014) observed a decrease in self-reported positive affect for 
donating and donations when facing two victims where one could be helped, compared to 
only facing one victim that could be helped. The authors argue that proportional reasoning, or 
drop-in-the-bucket thinking, is not feasible, since in the case with the two victims the 
proportion of victims helped are still 50%, relatively high compared to the studies 
investigating proportion dominance (25% in the low proportion). Physiological responses 
linked to positive affect decreased when not all victims could be helped. The physiological 
measure was activity of the Zygomaticus Major (a facial muscle used for smiling). Increased 
activity was linked to actual increase in donations, in other words, degrees of smiling was 
linked to magnitude of donations. Smiling activity decreased as more than one victim was 
viewed, and lower donations was related to less of a smile. This decrease in positive affect 
when facing victims that cannot be helped has been demonstrated with both human lives at 
risk (Västfjäll et al., 2014) and with non-human victims (Markowitz, Slovic, Västfjäll & 
Hodges, 2013). 
In the research on pseudoinefficacy problems arise that this thesis will address 
experimentally. First, active or aroused emotion and the anticipation of future emotion are 
frequently used interchangeably. Västfjäll et al. (2015) writes: “We hypothesize that 
knowledge of those “out of reach” may have triggered negative feelings that countered the 
good feelings anticipated from giving aid, thus demotivating action.” and “even when the 
numbers of affected individuals are small, negative affect associated with awareness of those 
not helped reduces the warm glow arising from doing good things”. These quotes might 
describe three different things: 1. Active or aroused emotion where a reduction in positive 
emotion is elicited by thinking of a future event. The current emotional state is changed by 
eliciting negative emotion. 2. A mix, where non-affective deliberation of possible future 
emotion is affected by elicited active negative emotion. 3. A non-affective cognitive process 
were the anticipation of emotion changes, i.e. instead of thinking that the outcome will lead 
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to positive emotion, the outcome is now believed to be leading to negative emotion. To put 
this in simpler terms, it is unclear if the affective process is referring to aroused emotion or 
cognitive processes that refers to emotional states. 
This confusion between active or anticipated emotion is present in the 
experimentation. One of the dependent variables is: “how do you feel about donating to 
Rokia/Moussa/the child?” where the participants rated this on a scale ranging from Negative 
(-1) to positive (+5). It is unclear if this measure targets the participants current feeling when 
thinking about donating, or a more cognitive target were the question is probing what the 
participant thinks he/she will experience emotionally post-decision. This is somewhat 
redeemed in the follow up study when measuring anticipated emotion: “If I donated money, I 
would experience a warm glow feeling.”, but the measure for positive affect suffers from the 
same confusion: “I have positive feelings when I think about Nayani/the child.”. Here it is 
unclear if this positive feeling is related to donating towards Nayani or the current emotion 
about her situation (which probably is negative in affect). A similar argument can be made of 
the beforementioned studies measuring smiling, is the target of interest the impact of current 
emotion, or anticipated emotion? I argue that smiling can be attributed to both, which makes 
it hard to know if the participant is thinking specifically about post-decision emotion. 
Another problem is that warm glow and help intention is used interchangeably in the 
experimentation. The pseudoinefficacy effect is according to the authors own definition when 
help intention or help efforts is decreasing. As an example of this confusion, one of the 
experiments demonstrated decreased warm glow when thinking about helping a victim when 
irrelevant negative stimuli was presented, the authors conclude that pseudoinefficacy was 
replicated. It is unclear if the pseudoinefficacy effect denotes decreasing warm glow or 
decreasing help intention when only examining the experimentation. Keeping these 
constructs separate are important since other factors besides warm glow can affect help 
intention or donations, examples of these factors are perceived duty (Baron, Ritov & Greene, 
2011) and the anticipation of guilt if not helping (Shepherd, Spears & Manstead, 2012). 
In this thesis pseudoinefficacy will be further examined using a clear definition of 
what positive affect denotes (anticipated warm glow) and hopefully there will be no 
confusion in the constructs surrounding emotional impact on help efforts. In addition the 
affective component will be clearly separated from help intention and behavioral output in 
both the theoretical approach and in experimentation. In this thesis both help efforts and 
anticipated emotion are tested as separate constructs, if these constructs follow a similar 
pattern, anticipated positive emotion can be used as a proxy for help efforts. If the constructs 
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do not follow a similar pattern, it will indicate that anticipated warm glow and help efforts 
should be viewed and treated as different constructs. 
Anticipated emotion 
There is an ongoing debate on the predictive power of aroused or active emotion 
compared to the anticipation of emotions that are outcome dependent. A recent meta-analysis 
showed that current emotion as a predictor for judgment or behavior was only significant in 
22% of the studies that were included in the analysis, on the other hand in the few cases when 
anticipation of emotion was measured, 87% of the experiments were significant (DeWall, 
Baumeister, Chester & Bushman, 2015). The theories that put emphasis on anticipated 
emotions argue that behavior pursue emotion, and that emotion acts as feedback to evaluate 
outcomes of behavior. Anticipating these outcomes with the help of affective values 
connected to a certain outcome is an anticipated emotion (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall & 
Zhang, 2007). There is however also evidence for active emotion and its impact on judgment 
(Lerner, Small & Loewenstein, 2004), but the differences between active and anticipated 
emotion, and the debate surrounding which one is the most impactful are outside the scope of 
this thesis. This difference is brought up to make it clear that specifically affective evaluation 
in the form of anticipated warm glow is of interest here, and not aroused emotion or actual 
experiences of emotion after donating (or not donating). 
Mellers, Schwartz and ritov (1999) developed decision affect theory, where the 
subjective expected pleasure of an outcome predicts a preference for certain decisions. In a 
series of gambling experiments the authors showed that both the anticipation of negative 
emotion such as regret if not winning, and anticipation of positive emotion if winning 
predicted choices. Options with greater mean post-choice positive emotion were preferred 
choices. In addition, predictions of future emotion in gambling contexts seem accurate 
(Mellers, 2000) and participants report more intense emotions when thinking about the future 
than when remembering emotion (Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007). Although negative 
anticipated emotion such as guilt or fear can successfully predict sharing (Nelissen, Leliveld, 
Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2011) in this thesis emphasis is on positive anticipated emotion. 
Anticipated warm glow. The concept of warm glow stems from the field of 
economics. When economic models of charity without self-interest or so called pure altruism 
failed to describe charity, James Andreoni (1990) proposed a model including self-interest. 
Impure altruism or giving with some self-interest was a better predictor for charitable 
donations, where feeling good about donating is partly the value that is paid for. The model 
was also experimentally successful in predicting behavior when the distribution of goods was 
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framed as charitable (Andreoni, 1995). Other studies from the field of economics have 
successfully used the warm glow model to predict differences in charitable behavior 
depending on group size of recipients (Andreoni, 2007), and connecting giving to 
psychological well being, increase in positive affect, and less related to negative affect 
(Konow & Earley, 2008).  
In a modified version of the dictator game pure altruism was tested against warm 
glow giving. The dictator game has two players, one is the dictator and the other one is the 
recipient. The dictator divides resources between herself and the recipient. What most often 
happens when using this paradigm is that the dictator elects to share even though there are no 
economical consequences for keeping all the resources. In this particular version, the dictator 
was informed that the other part would receive the same amount regardless if they elect to 
share or not. Participants shared around 25% of the resources even though this had no 
financial impact for the recipient. The authors argued that this sharing must therefore be 
because of self-interest, or warm glow. To clarify this, sharing cannot be other focused 
without any impact on an anonymous other. In addition, other explanations as direct social 
pressure or anticipated praise was controlled for (Crumpler & Grossman, 2008). Closely 
related to Andreoni’s warm glow giving, Duncan (2004) introduced a model where the 
perceived impact of giving is important for donors, it is theorized that for the donor the 
impact is important to experience fulfillment. 
Outside the field of pure economics, Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) investigated the 
valuation of environmental interventions such as cleaning up oil spills, saving endangered 
animals, and research on tropical diseases. Participants were generally more willing to 
contribute to causes that lead to higher warm glow, i.e participants were willing to contribute 
3x the amount towards replanting trees in British Columbia compared to western Canada, 
even though British Columbia is a part of western Canada. Willingness to pay was 
successfully predicted by the warm glow that was anticipated for contributing to the project. 
It seems like being able to perceive a personal impact is an important predecessor for 
anticipating warm glow, more specific interventions (replanting in British Columbia) might 
be easier to attribute to a personal impact, i.e. I helped replant trees in this specific area, I 
feel like a good person. Similarly experiments noted an increase in donations when there 
were possibilities for making a relatively greater personal impact (Gneezy et al., 2010), 
Gneezy, Keenan & Gneezy, 2014 also found increasing donations in a large field study (N = 
40 000), participants were informed that prior donors had already paid for the overhead costs, 
100% of their personal donation would now go towards the project where clean water would 
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be supplied in developing nations. The project with no overhead cost for the donor raised 
over twice as much funds as the control project.  
Furthermore, personal impact is fully mediated by personal satisfaction (Cryder, 
Loewenstein & Seltman 2013), a construct closely related to warm glow. When participants 
were personally responsible for sharing, donations were higher compared to when individuals 
shared responsibility in a group (Cryder & Loewenstein, 2012.) The authors argued that 
being able to take credit for sharing increases donations; this effect is possibly driven by 
warm glow since there is no reason for selfless donations to show this pattern. You could 
argue that anticipating guilt, or anticipating negative self-focused emotion could drive this 
behavior. It is important to note that anticipated warm glow is probably not the only 
important factor, it is however the focus of this thesis. If donations were primarily driven by 
selfless acts or pure altruism, personal impact would arguably have a smaller effect 
regardless of the self-focused anticipated emotions are positive or negative. 
Warm glow has also been established as a motivating factor for donating blood. For 
blood donors there was no relation between reported warm glow if donating blood and 
donating for the sake of helping society (Ferguson, Farrell & Lawrence, 2008). This is further 
evidence indicating that warm glow is a motivating factor for experienced donors, whereas 
pure altruism or a selfless motivation was not a plausible cause. 
In a large Dutch sample (N = 12000) of donors, the same authors found that warm 
glow important for repeated donations. Warm glow mediated the relation between intention 
to donate and actual blood donation. In additional experimentations participants that gave 
most to a aid organization also experienced warm glow (Ferguson, Atsma, De Kort & 
Veldhuizen, 2012), however the measurement used for warm glow was a dichotomous yes/no 
question if the donation made them feel good about themselves, this measurement is 
something that the authors themselves acknowledge as lacking in reliability. 
In conclusion to this theoretical background I want to bring up the different views of 
the warm glow construct, Harbaugh et al., 2007 uses anticipated warm glow synonymously 
with anticipated praise. In this thesis the aim of how anticipated warm glow is measured is 
only anticipation of active positive emotion and not anticipated praise or increased social 
status. An example of this distinction is to ask about expected future happiness or warm glow 
compared to asking about how other people will view your behavior or how the decision will 
affect social status. 
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Hypotheses 
 I will manipulate victim stories where all victims can be helped (1 identified victim, 9 
identified victims, 9 statistical victims), and victim statistics where there are victims that 
cannot be helped (victim statistics vs. no statistics). Help intention (self reported help effort) 
and anticipated warm glow will be measured. In accordance with the presented theory and 
descriptive findings, I hypothesize that: 
 
1. The identified victim effect (Kogut & Ritov, 1995a, b) will be replicated but only 
when no victim statistics are presented. Specifically, higher help intention for the 
victim stories with identified victims (1 identified victim, 9 identified victims) 
compared to the victim story with a group of statistical victims (9 statistical victims). 
2. Pseudoinefficacy (Västfjäll et al., 2014, 2015) will be replicated, this means that 
help intention will decrease for victim stories when victim statistics are presented. In 
addition, pseudoinefficacy will be greatest for 1 identified victim. 
3. Anticipated warm glow is here hypothesized to be an important factor related to 
pseudoinefficacy, therefore anticipated warm glow will be lower for all victim stories, 
but will be lowest for 1 identified victim when victim statistics are presented. 
4. Changes in anticipated warm glow will be more strongly related to 1 identified 
victim than 9 statistical victims. In accordance with the model presented by Hamilton 
and Sherman (1996). Therefore, the relations between anticipated warm glow and 
help intentions will be stronger when reading about 1 identified victim compared to 9 
statistical victims. 
 
Study 1 
This experiment was partially based on the paradigm used by Small, Loewenstein & 
Slovic (2007). Fictitious humanitarian aid ads were used that described victims of the current 
civil war in Syria. The design of this experiment allows for two ways of analyzing the results 
one mixed within-between analysis where the same participant rates both statistical and 
identified victims, but different groups are exposed to victim statistics. The second analysis is 
a full between-group analysis where both victim types and being exposed to victim statistics 
is manipulated. 
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Method 
 Ethics. This study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the declaration 
of Helsinki. All participants read and agreed to informed consent and was briefed on the both 
the procedure and the aim of the study. The participants had the opportunity to abort at any 
time and being fully debriefed after participation. All participants were compensated as 
agreed upon. 
Participants. Two hundred and ninety-six students from four Swedish universities1 
(Mage =24.53, SDage = 3.85; 71.7% women, 3 failed to report sex) completed a 5-minute pen-
and-paper package. As compensation the participants could elect to participate in a raffle for 
a gift card worth 100 Swedish kronor (SEK). Participants were randomly assigned to groups 
by being handed questionnaires with varying content. The experimenter was aware of the 
hypotheses but blinded to group assignment. Eligible participants were Swedish-speaking 
students over the age of 18 years. 
A power analysis was conducted to determine the sample size using Gpower software 
(Faul, Erdfelder & Lang, 2007). In a prior study where victim identifiability was manipulated 
in a 2 x 2 design, the effect sizes of donations where, η2 = .06 (Small et al., 2007). In addition, 
a pilot study was conducted (N = 16), and the estimated effect size was lowered to η2 = .04. 
The power analysis indicated that a total sample size of N = 255 would be sufficient to detect 
interaction effects at η2 = .04 with 90% power and α .05, for a between subject 2 x 2 design 
measuring help effort. 
Procedure and materials. First, the participants were informed that they would 
answer a 4-5 minute questionnaire about their attitudes and feelings towards proposals of ads 
for humanitarian aid. The participants were instructed to individually complete the 
questionnaire in silence without discussing the content or their answers with anyone before 
completion. Participants were instructed to complete the survey in order, judging one ad at 
the time, and that it was forbidden to go back in the questionnaire to directly compare the ads. 
These instructions were repeated in text on the cover sheet of the questionnaire. Both of these 
instructions and experimenter observation were used to lower the risk of completing the 
questionnaire in wrong order. 
Secondly, the participants read an informed consent form; 1. “We investigate 
attitudes, decisions, and feelings. The purpose of the study is to examine how different 
                                               
1 Participants*were*recruited*in*public*areas*at*Chalmers*University*of*Technology,*University*of*Gothenburg,*
Lund*University*(Campus*Helsingborg),*and*Malmö*University. 
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proposed ads for humanitarian aid are perceived.”; 2. Anonymity, no personal information 
will be collected, and no answers can be linked to a certain participant; 3. Instructions: “How 
is this study conducted? You will read three different proposed ads and answer questions 
after reading each ad. It is important that you answer all of the questions. The questionnaire 
will take about 5 minutes to complete.”; 4. Participation is voluntary; “you can abort at any 
time without losing the compensation.” After reading the instructions and signing informed 
consent, the participants filled in the questionnaire. 
Third, all participants read three ads and answered questions after each one. The 
victim story was varied over three levels of identifiability; the first level depicts one Syrian 
refugee girl with name and age (1 identified victim = 1IV). The second level depicts nine 
named Syrian refugee girls (9 identified victims = 9IV). The third level depicts nine statistical 
victims that are yet to be determined with silhouettes of girls and question marks substituting 
names (9 statistical victims = 9SV), see Figure 2. Half of the participants read the ads in the 
1IV, 9IV, 9SV order, whereas the other half read the ads in the opposite order. The picture of 
the singular victim was balanced using five different depicted victims of the Syrian conflict; 
this was to ensure that measured differences between conditions are due to the singular 
identified victim effect and not changes in effect caused by a particular child, facial 
expression or image type, similar balancing has been successfully implemented in earlier 
experiments (Kogut & Ritov, 1995a, b). The singular identified victim image was also always 
one of the images for the nine identified victims, this means that the nine identified victim 
condition consists of eight additional victims, differences in measurement cannot be 
attributed to different victim pictures. The victim story was described using the headline: 
“You can help Ranim”, followed by: 
 
This is Ranim, who has escaped the violence in Syria. Ranim lacks health care for a 
serious kidney disease. During the last six months, Ranim has taken shelter in a 
refugee camp. The money you donate will go to Ranim, a former resident of Syria 
suffering from Alport disease, an inheritable kidney disease. The disease is 
progressive and leads to declining kidney function. Ranim needs regular dialysis to 
survive. With your support and the support of other people, Save the Children will 
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work in refugee camps to offer the care Ranim needs. It is guaranteed that Ranim’s 
life will change for the better as a result of your donation.2 
 
The name “Ranim” was used in the 1IV condition and changed to “The nine children” in the 
9IV condition, and “children” in the 9SV condition. 
Fourth, for half of the participants, all three ads included a statistics box with victim 
statistics, whereas for the other half, no victim statistics was presented in any of the ads. The 
statistics box was placed on the same page before information about the particular victims. It 
included victim statistics concerning the Syrian conflict see Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure'1.*Statistics*box*containing*victim*statistics*that*were*displayed*for*half*of*the*participants.*The*text*is*
translated*from*Swedish.*
 
Fifth, the participants filled in questions about each ad separately and ended the 
participation by filling in demographic questions. The participants were given the opportunity 
to be debriefed and to ask questions. Lastly the participants that wanted to be part of the 
lottery for gift cards could leave their email addresses separated from the questionnaires to 
ensure anonymity. 
Independent variables. Type of victim story was manipulated in three levels (1IV, 
9IV, 9SV). In the between-group analysis only 1IV vs. 9SV was used. The strongest form of 
identifiability is one singular victim and this level is 1IV (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, b, 2007). 
The weakest form of identifiability is if the victim is non-determined (Jenni & Loewenstein, 
                                               
2"Increasing*the*perceived*impact*to*avoid*floor*effects,*by*insuring*the*participants*that*the*donation*will*reach*
the*victim*(Cryder,*Loewenstein*&*Scheines,*2013)."
INFORMATION 
The current state for refugees affected by the war in Syria. 
The Syrian civil war is an ongoing conflict between the supporters of Bashar al-Assads 
Baath government and the people that want it overthrown. The soon to be four year long 
conflict in Syria has escalated and almost 11 million people are in need of humanitarian 
aid. FN estimates that there is almost 6.5 million internal refugees in Syria and over 3 
million on the run in Syria’s neighboring countries; Lebanon (1 185 000), Turkey (850 
000), Jordan (615 000), Iraq (215 000) and Egypt (140 000). The most commonly 
reported causes of death amongst the refugees include diarrheal diseases, measles, 
acute respiratory infections, malaria, and malnutrition.
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1997), therefore the 9SV are here purely statistical by making them undetermined. As seen in 
the procedure and materials section, this is manipulated by letting the participants know that 
the help will reach victims that are not decided yet, i.e. the intervention will help nine 
children, but we don’t know who they are yet. 
The second manipulation was the inclusion of a statistics box (victim statistics vs. no 
statistics). The information in the statistics box includes victims that cannot be helped. See 
Figure 1. This information is similar to what was successfully used as statistics manipulation 
in Small et al., (2007). 
Dependent variables. Anticipated warm glow was measured using two 7-grade 
Likert scale, the items consisted of: 1. “I would experience an extremely strong feeling of 
warm glow if I donated money to Ranim/The 9 children/9 children” anchored at 1 (No warm 
glow at all), 4 (Warm glow), and 7 (Extreme warm glow); 2. “I would feel extreme happiness 
if I donated money to Ranim/The 9 children/9 children” anchored at 1 (No happiness at all), 4 
(Happiness), and 7 (Extreme happiness). The items were aggregated using means to form the 
anticipated warm glow scale. 
Anticipated experience as a good person if donating was measured using a 7-grade 
Likert scale, “I would experience myself as a extremely good person if I donated money to 
Ranim/The 9 children/9 children” anchored at 1 (No good person at all), 4 (Good person), 
and 7 (Extremely good person). This item tried to capture more cognitive aspects of of how 
other people would perceive the judgment. This item was collected for purposes outside of 
the scope of this paper and will not be analyzed as a part of the result section; the 
measurement is however reported in appendix A. 
Help intention was measured using three 7-grade Likert scales. The items consisted 
of: 1. “How probable is it that you would donate money to Ranim/The 9 children/9children in 
this specific case?” anchored at 1 (0%), 4 (Around 50%), and 7 (100%); 2. “How motivated 
would you be to donate money for Ranim/The 9 children/9children in this specific case?” 
anchored at 1 (Not motivated at all), 4 (motivated), and 7 (extremely motivated); 3. “Imagine 
that you would win 1000 SEK in a lottery, how much of the prize would you donate to 
Ranim/The 9 Children/9 Children in this specific case?” anchored at 1 (0 SEK), 4 (500 SEK), 
and 7 (1000 SEK). Hypothetical donations are often used to successfully to measure 
differences in valuations between victim types (Baron, 1997). Hypothetical donations are also 
related to real donations, often 2-8 times larger than real donations (Brown, Champ, Bishop 
& McCollum, 1996), but in some trials actual donations were larger than the hypothetical 
ones (MacMillan, Smart & Thorburn, 1999). 
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Lastly, two variables were measured: 1. Perception of the humanitarian aid 
organization behind the ad, “If a humanitarian aid organization used this specific ad, how 
would you perceive the humanitarian aid organization?” anchored at 1 (extremely negative), 
4 (neutral), 7 (extremely positive); 2. Manipulation control for the presenting a statistics box 
vs. no statistics, “How many facts do you experience that this particular ad contains?” 
anchored at 1 (extremely few), and 7 (extremely many). In addition, basic demographics 
were measured; the participants checked a box for male/female and filled in their age.  
Design. As mentioned in the experimental overview, the experiment consisted of one 
between-group, and one mixed between-within-group design. Two ways of analyzing the 
experiment were made possible by only using the first level from the balanced orders of 
presentation from the three within-group factors (1IV or 9SV), see red boxes in Figure 2 for 
clarification. Primarily, a 2 x 2 between-group design with two factors. The first factor varied 
victim identifiability (1IV vs. 9SV), and the second factor was presenting a statistics box 
(victim statistics vs. no statistics). Secondarily, a 2 x 3 mixed within-between subject design 
with three factors. The within-group factor varied victim story (1IV; 9IV; 9SV). The 
between-group factor was presenting a statistics box (victim statistics vs. no statistics).  
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Figure'2.*Design*of*Study*1.*This*figure*illustrates*the*mixed*withinMgroup*design,*betweenMgroup*design,*and*the*
order*of*presentation.*The*four*cells*represent*the*betweenMgroup*factors.*In*the*2*x*2*betweenMgroup*design*
the*ads*represented*by*red*boxes*were*used*(only*the*first*ads).*Arrows*indicate*order*of*presentation.*
 
 This design also allows for comparison of the identifiable victim effect and 
differences in anticipated warm glow for both joint evaluation (within-group) and separate 
evaluation (between-group). Evaluations made within-group can sometimes differ from 
between group since in the within-group design you have external reference points, which 
here is the ads the participants already have seen. In the between-group design there is no 
direct external reference points for the evaluations. For instance the identifiable victim effect 
is sometimes not found in joint-evaluation, but found in separate evaluation (Kogut & Ritov, 
2005b), whereas the proportion dominance effect is present in both (Bartels, 2006). In 
addition there is evidence of reversals of preferences depending on joint or separate 
evaluations (Zhee & Zhang, 2010). 
Results 
Data control. All items were examined for parameters. Outliers were examined, 1 
case was removed due to missing values (filled in less than 50% of the items) and 5 
univariate outliers were removed using a cut off value of absolute Z > 3.29. Multivariate 
outliers were examined using SPSS Regression, standardized residuals were < 3.3 σ, 1 outlier 
were found using Mahalanobis distance with a cut off value of p < .001. The two items for 
the anticipated warm glow scale, and the three items for the help intention scale was screened 
for reliability using Cronbach's α and the items were aggregated using means, Cronbach's α 
values are seen in Table 1. Attitude towards the aid organisation behind the ad only had a 
minor impact on results and will not be analyzed in the result section see Appendix A. 
 
Table*1.**
Alpha'values'for'anticipated'warm'glow'and'help'intention.'
* Anticipated*Warm*Glow* * Help*Intention*
Victim*story* Statistics*box* * No*statistics* * Statistics*box* * No*statistics*
1*Identified*victim* .74* * .88* * .85* * .79*
9*Statistical*victims* .79* * .75* * .86* * .78*
"
Manipulations-check. Participants who read the humanitarian aid ads with a 
statistics box reported that they experienced more facts (M = 4.60, SD = 1.45) than 
participants who read the ads without a box (M = 3.7, SD = 1.44), t(289) = −5.29, p < .001, r 
= .30. This indicates that presenting a statistics box increased the experienced amount of facts 
in the ad. 
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Between-subject analysis. To examine main effects and interaction effects for victim 
story and presenting victim statistics on; anticipated warm glow if donating and help 
intention, a series of 2 (1IV vs. 9SV) x 2 (victim statistics vs. no statistics) between-group 
ANOVAs were conducted. 
Anticipated warm glow. There was no main effect of reading an ad with 1IV or 9SV 
on anticipated warm glow, F(1, 292) = 1.31, p = .254, η2 = .01. When testing the overall 
impact of the statistics box on anticipated warm glow there was a non-significant main effect, 
F(1, 292) = 2.67, p = .103, η2 = .01, this tendency indicated lower anticipated warm glow for 
the groups being exposed to victim statistics. When inspecting graphs, see Figure 3, 
anticipated warm glow was only lower for 1IV presented with statistics, this interaction was 
approaching significance, F(1, 292) = 2.79, p = .096, η2 = .01. Although this interaction 
effect was non-significant, this tendency indicated that presenting victim statistics had a 
different effect on anticipated warm glow depending on victim story. Sidak corrected 
contrasts revealed that presenting a statistics box did not have any effect on anticipated warm 
glow for 9SV, F(1, 288) = .00, p = .974, η2 = .00. However, in line with hypothesis, 
anticipated warm glow for 1IV was significantly lower when presented with victim statistics, 
F(1, 288) = 5.42, p = .021, η2 = .02.3 
  
Figure'3.*Means*for*anticipated*warm*glow,*and*help*intention*for;*1*identified*victim,*and*9*statistical*victims*
for*the*reading*statistics*group*and*the*no*statistics*group.*Error*bars*represents*standard*errors.*
 
                                               
3 Anticipated*warm*glow*decreased*slightly*for*1*identified*victim*compared*to*9*statistical*victims*when*
presented*with*a*victim*statistics,*F(1,*288)*=*6.44,*p*=*.048,*η2*=*.01.*This*decrease*was*absent*without*statistics,*
F(1,*288)*=*.15,*p*=*.704,*η2*=*.00. 
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Help intention. The impact of presenting different victim stories on help intention 
was analyzed in a similar manner, there was no main effect on help intention for type of 
victim possible to help, F(1, 293) = .35, p = .552, η2 = .00. Presenting victim statistics lead to 
no overall decrease in help intention, F(1, 293) = .89, p = .345, η2 = .00. In other words, when 
the victim story type is disregarded, participants’ help intention was similar for ads with or 
without victim statistics. However, the interaction effect was highly significant between 1IV 
or 9SV stories and presenting victim statistics, see Figure 3, F(1, 293) = 7.96, p = .005, η2 = 
.03. To examine how help intention for 1IV compared to 9SV differed depending on if a 
statistics box was presented, contrasts were performed. In accordance with the hypothesis, 
participants were less willing to donate for 1IV when victim statistics were included, F(1, 
289) = 6.97, p = .009, η2 = .02. This effect was in the opposite direction for 9SV, but non-
significant, F(1, 289) = 1.79, p = .182, η2 = .01, indicating that presenting victim statistics 
affected ratings of 1IV more than the 9SV and in the opposite direction. Participants were 
more willing to donate towards 9SV compared to 1IV when presenting victim statistics, F(1, 
289) = 5.81, p = .017, η2 = .02.  
The expected identifiable victim effect (see dark bars in Figure 3.), when no victim 
statistics were presented was non-significant, F(1, 289) = 2.49, p = .116, η2 = .003, although 
the identifiable victim effect was non-significant, there was a tendency in the direction of the 
hypothesis. Participants with no exposure to victim statistics had a slightly lower intention to 
help 9SV compared to 1IV. 
The relation between anticipated warm glow and help intention. To explore 
relations between anticipated warm glow and help intention depending on group, the data 
were split and anticipated warm glow was correlated with help intention, see Table 2. The 
analysis indicated slightly higher correlational strength between anticipated warm glow and 
help intention in the groups reading the victim story about 1IV compared to 9SV. This is in 
line with expected results since it was hypothesized that judgments on help intention for 1IV 
would be more dependent on anticipated warm glow. 
*
Table*2.**
Correlations'between'anticipated'warm'glow'and'help'intention'in'Study'1.'
* 1*identified*victim* * 9*statistical*victims*
Measure* No*statistics* Statistics*box* * No*statistics* Statistics*box*
Help*intention* .60*** .62*** * .53*** .50***
'Note***p*<*.001*
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Within-between-subject analysis. To examine main effects and interaction effects 
for victim story and presenting a statistics box on; anticipated warm glow if donating and 
help intention, a series of: 2 between (victim statistics vs. no statistics) x 3 (1IV, 9IV, 9SV) 
mixed within-between-group ANOVAs were conducted. All reported items are Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected were appropriate. 
First potential order effects were analyzed and there was no significant within-
between group 3-way interaction between presenting a statistics box, order and different 
victim stories on anticipated warm glow, F(1.79, 512.99) = .31, p = .709, η2 = .00, and help 
intention, F(1.94, 274.28) = .03, p = .759, η2 = .00. This indicates that there is no order-effect 
that significantly influences changes over victim stories dependent on exposure to victim 
statistics. There was however order effects for ratings on both anticipated warm glow and 
help intention on victim stories, these are reported in the Appendix A, and had no greater 
impact on the reported results. 
Anticipated warm glow. The overall effect of exposure to statistics showed a 
between-group main effect that was approaching significance on anticipated warm glow, F(1, 
289) = 3.37, p = .067, η2 = .01. The group being presented with victim statistics rated overall 
lower anticipated warm glow, see darker line in Figure 4. 
Regardless of exposure to victim statistics, there was a large significant within-group 
main effect for victim stories on anticipated warm glow, F(1.78, 512.99) = 107.35, p < .001, 
η2 = .27. Bonferroni corrected contrasts revealed that anticipated warm glow was significantly 
lower for 9SV compared to 9IV, F(1, 289) = 190.45, p < .001, η2 = .40, and compared to 1IV, 
F(1, 289) = 102.88, p < .001, η2 = .26. This indicates that participants anticipated 
considerably less warm glow for the statistical victims compared to the same number of 
identified victims (identifiability), and also less than 1IV(singularity effect). Anticipated 
warm glow was higher for 9IV compared to 1IV. However, this difference was not 
significant, F(1, 289) = 4.57, p = .10, η2 = .02. When inspecting graphs, see Figure 4, the 
differences in ratings depending on if victim statistics were presented is symmetric, and 
analysis confirmed that there was no interaction, F(1.79, 512.99) = .18, p = .811, η2 = .00. 
This indicates that being presented with victim statistics does not affect differences in ratings 
of anticipated warm glow for the victim stories. This goes against the hypothesis in the 
within-group design with joint evaluation of the victim stories. 
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Figure'4.*Means*for*anticipated*warm*glow*and*help*intention*towards*1*identified*victim,*9*identified*victims,*
and*9*statistical*victims*for*the*group*presented*with*a*statistics*box*and*for*the*no*statistics*group.*Error*bars*
represents*standard*errors.*
 
Help intention. Help intention showed a similar pattern within-group as anticipated 
warm glow, but not within-between, see Figure 4, where there was no between-group effect 
of presenting victim statistics on help intention, F(1, 289) = .01, p = .926, η2 = .00, and no 
significant significant within-between interaction of presenting victim statistics and different 
victim stories on help intention, F(1.90, 549.17) = 2.10, p = .126, η2 = .01, This indicates that 
when the same participant rated help intention for different victim stories, the statistics box 
had no influence. In addition, overall ratings for the victim stories were similar when 
presenting victim statistics. The between group effect of decreased anticipated warm glow 
when presenting victim statistics were absent for help intention. 
In addition, regardless if presenting the victim stories with victim statistics, there was 
a large significant within-group main effect for victim stories on help intention, F(1.90, 
549.17) = 115.78, p < .001, η2 = .29. Bonferroni corrected contrasts revealed that help 
intention increased slightly for 9IV compared to 1IV, F(1, 289) = 11.29, p < .001, η2 = .04. In 
contrast, help intention decreased steeply for 9SV, F(1, 289) = 225.72, p < .001, η2 = .44. 
This replicates the identifiable victim effect within-group, but not the singularity effect. 
Summary 
 When no victim statistics were presented the was a tendency of the identifiable victim 
effect between-group (separate evaluation) and the effect was replicated within-group (joint 
evaluation). This is important because it sets up a baseline to compare how victim statistics 
will affect the higher help intention for 1IV compared to 9SV (or 1IV, 9IV compared to 9SV 
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within subject). As expected introducing victim statistics between-subject led to decreasing 
help intention for specifically 1IV, therefore no identifiable victim effect was found when 
victims that cannot be helped was salient. In line with Västfjäll et al., (2014, 2015) 
pseudoinefficacy was demonstrated, but here I show that pseudoinefficacy specifically affects 
the evaluation for 1IV and not for 9SV. There was however no pseudoinefficacy dependent 
on victim statistics in the mixed within-between analysis, both the victim statistics group and 
the no statistics group replicated the identifiable victim effect. I expected no identifiable 
victim effect in the within-group (joint evaluation) when victim statistics were presented. In 
addition participants rated 1IV slightly lower than 9IV within-group similar to what was 
found by Kogut and Ritov (2005b). 
 In line with hypothesis, anticipated warm glow did decrease specifically for 1IV 
presented with victim statistics between-group. However compared to the other conditions, 
see Figure 3, the lowest measured anticipated warm glow was for 1IV. In comparison the 
highest levels of affect measured in Small et al.,(2007) was for the 1IV without statistics, 
here 1IV without statistics is at the same level as for both 9SV conditions. This indicates that 
decreasing anticipated warm glow for 1IV with victim stats is responsible for the difference 
and not increased levels for 1IV presented with no stats. In other words, it is the lack of 
anticipated warm glow that is responsible for this effect and not increasing levels. 
 In this study both help intention and anticipated warm glow was measured 
simultaneous and not manipulated, there can be no causal claims between the constructs. 
However the relations can be explored, and if anticipated warm glow is a more important 
factor for help intention for particularly 1IV these relations would be stronger, this was 
precisely what was found. Although the difference in relations for 1IV and 9SV was small, 
and not directly tested, this is an indication of the importance of anticipated warm glow for 
help intentions more so for 1IV than for 9SV. A slightly stronger relation between affect 
ratings and help efforts was found by Small et al.,(2007) for 1IV presented without statistics. 
Here the result is in the same direction, but for specifically anticipated warm glow. This 
relation was shown to be weaker for 9SV, this shows that specifically 1IV is more related to 
anticipated warm glow, something Small et al., did not find since there was no manipulation 
of the victims that can be helped in their experimentation.  
 I also showed that ratings of anticipated warm glow and help intentions did not follow 
the same pattern and therefore anticipated warm glow cannot be considered a proxy for 
measuring help intentions. For instance there were no changes in anticipated warm glow for 
9SV depending on victim statistics, whereas this level was different for help intention. The 
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indication of an increase in help intention for 9SV presented with statistics is a never before 
seen effect that will be brought up in the general discussion. 
 A weakness of this study is the use of hypothetical help or self reported help intention 
and therefore a second study will be conducted using real donations. In addition the new 
study will see if the results from Study 1 are robust. 
Study 2 
In the second experiment the 2 (victim statistics vs. no statistics) x 2 (1IV vs. 9SV) 
between-group part of the design from Study 1 is replicated with the addition of measuring 
real donations. Real donations are not possible to measure in repeated measure using this 
design, so the within-group part was removed.4. Not only will the stability of the former 
result be tested using the same dependent variables, the constraining effect of victim statistics 
on the identifiable victim effect will also be tested with real donations. 
Method 
Ethics. This study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the declaration 
of Helsinki. All participants read and agreed to informed consent and was briefed on the both 
the procedure and the aim of the study. The participants had the opportunity to abort at any 
time and being fully debriefed after participation. All participants were compensated as 
agreed upon. 
Participants. Two hundred students from five Swedish universities (Mage =24.95, 
SDage = 4.92; 65% women, 13 failed to report sex) completed a pen-and-paper package. I 
recruited participants individually in public campus areas5, as compensation they received 3 
state lottery tickets (Mini Trisslott) with a total value of 30 SEK. The participants were 
randomly assigned and the experimenter was blinded to group assignments, see Study 1 for 
details. Eligible participants were Swedish-speaking students over the age of 18 years. 
Design. The experiment was a partial replication of Study 1; this study only used the 
2 x 2 between-groups design. The first factor varied victim story (1IV vs. 9SV), and the 
second factor were presenting a statistics box (victim statistics vs. no statistics). 
Procedure and materials. The experiment used the same procedure and materials as 
the between-group design of Study 1 with some adjustments made for measuring real 
donations. The participants were informed that they would receive 3 lottery tickets worth 
                                               
4 The*donation*part*is*not*known*to*the*participants*prior*to*encountering*it,*hence*repetition*of*donations*are*
impossible.*There*is*also*difficulties*with*resources*since*donating*in*earlier*rounds*decreases*available*
resources*in*later*conditions. 
5"Participants*were*recruited*at:*Chalmers*University*of*Technology*(Gothenburg),*University*of*Gothenburg,*
Lund*University*(Campus*Helsingborg),*Halmstad*University,*and*Malmö*University 
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10SEK each, with a total value of 30SEK, for participating. The participants were shown to a 
pre-set table in public campus areas where they could sit alone. After rating the ad and 
finalizing the donation decision participants deposited the completed package in a clearly 
marked answer box placed on the table. Participants were informed that the answer box 
insured anonymity, and that they do not have to meet the experimenter, or explain their 
decisions when the trial is over. This step was implemented to decrease possible demand 
effects for donating in all conditions to avoid a ceiling effect (in Study 1 the experimenter 
was given the completed questionnaire personally). In addition anticipated praise is closely 
related to anticipated warm glow, anonymity might lower the risk of confounding anticipated 
praise with anticipated warm glow for the participants. 
The experimenter informed all participants of the importance to read the instructions, 
and to complete the questionnaire in order. This was to insure that rating the ad was as 
similar as possible compared to Study 1 and not affected by the addition of a donation 
decision. 
The second spread included the rewarded lottery tickets, secured to the first page with 
a clip. On the same page was an instruction text for making a donation to Save the Children, 
and an envelope glued at the bottom of the page, see Figure 5. The instructions read: 
  
You can now chose to donate with the help of the lottery tickets you got as a reward 
for your participation. Place the number of lottery tickets you want to donate to 
Ranim/9 children in the envelope at the bottom of the page. The value of the lottery 
tickets will be transferred to Save the Children when the study is over. Every lottery 
ticket is valued at 10 SEK. Your decision to donate is anonymous, you will not have 
to explain your decision or meet the experimenter when you have completed the 
questionnaire. Kindly glue the envelope together when you have made your choice. 
To ensure anonymity; glue the envelope together even if you elect for no donation. 
 
This means that the participants both received the lottery tickets, and were informed 
about the possibility for donating after they filled in questions about the ads. This was done 
so that the real donation, and receiving lottery tickets should have a smaller possible 
influence on the replicated ratings from Study 1. The participants ended the trial by 
answering basic demographics, and leaving the questionnaire in the answer box before 
leaving the table. The value of the lottery tickets was donated to Save the Children. 
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Figure'5.*The*design*of*Study*2*showing*ads*1*identified*victim,*9*statistical*victims*and*the*the*victim*statistics*
manipulation.*Arrows*indicate*order*of*presentation.*
 
Dependent variables. In addition to all dependent variables described in Study 1, a 
measure of donation was added with the question: "How much money do you chose to donate 
to Ranim/9 children?" Followed by four check boxes: "I donate 0 SEK (put no lottery ticket 
in the envelope)", I donate 10 SEK (put 1 lottery ticket in the envelope), I donate 20 SEK 
(put 2 lottery tickets in the envelope), and; I donate 30 SEK (put 3 lottery tickets in the 
envelope). In addition the check boxes the actual amount of lottery tickets left in the envelope 
was counted to insure that the correct number was reported. 
Results 
Data control. The data where screened for univariate outliers, no outliers were found. 
The 2 items for anticipated warm glow, and the three items for help intention, were 
aggregated using means and further examined for parameters. The two items for the 
anticipated warm glow scale, and the three items for help intention scale were screened for 
reliability using Cronbach's α, the items were aggregated using means, for Cronbach's α see 
Table 3. 
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Table*3.**
Alpha'values'for'anticipated'warm'glow'and'help'intention'for'Study'2.'
* Anticipated*Warm*Glow* * Help*Intention*
Victim*story* Statistics*box* * No*statistics* * Statistics*box* * No*statistics*
1*Identified*victim* .87* * .83* * .78* * .78*
9*Statistical*victims* .90* * .90* * .87* * .86*
"
Manipulations-check. On average, the participants who read the humanitarian aid 
ads with a statistics box reported that they experienced more facts (M = 4.46, SD = 1.42) than 
participants who read the ads without a box (M = 4.01, SD = 1.45), t(198) = −2.22, p = .028, r 
= .15. This indicates that presenting a statistics box led to a slightly higher experienced 
amount of facts in the ad. 
Analysis. To examine main effects and interaction effects for victim story and 
presenting a statistics box on; anticipated warm glow if donating and help intention, a series 
of 2 (1IV vs. 9SV) x 2 (victim statistics vs. no statistics) between-group ANOVAs were 
conducted.  
Anticipated warm glow. There was no main effect of presenting different victim 
stories, F(1, 196) = .72, p = .398, η2 = .00, on anticipated warm glow. There was however a 
tendency that participants anticipated more warm glow for victims presented without a 
statistics box, see Figure 6; but this effect was also non-significant, F(1, 196) = 1.90, p = 
.169, η2 = .01. No interaction effect was found, F(1, 196) = .03, p = .866, η2 = .00. 
 
  
Figure'6.*Means*for*anticipated*warm*glow,*and*help*intention*for;*1*identified*victim,*and*9*statistical*victims*
for*the*reading*statistics*group*and*the*no*statistics*group.*Error*bars*represents*standard*errors.*
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Help intention. Help intention showed a similar pattern as anticipated warm glow 
with no overall effect of presenting different victim stories on help intention, F(1, 196) = .13, 
p = .721, η2 = .00. This indicated similar help intention regardless of reading about 1IV or 
9SV when analyzing all groups together. There was a main effect approaching significance of 
presenting victim statistics on help intention, F(1, 196) = 3.20, p = .075, η2 = .02. This 
tendency indicated that participants intended to help slightly less when presented with victim 
statistics. No interaction effect was found, F(1, 196) = .08, p = .775, η2 = .00. For means see 
Figure 6. 
Donation. Donating with the use of lottery tickets was analyzed non-parametrically 
using a logistic regression, (no donation vs. donating 1-3 lottery tickets) with presenting a 
statistics box (victim statistics vs. no statistics), victim story (1IV vs. 9SV), and the 
interaction term (victim statistics × victim story). The full model revealed no effect for victim 
story on donation, Wald χ² (1, N = 200) = .23, p = .63, Exp(B) = .79. There was a non-
significant main effect of reading a statistics box, Wald χ² (1, N = 200) = 2.44, p = .118, 
Exp(B) = .49. This tendency is a weak indication of an overall decrease in probability for 
donations when a statistics box is presented. The interaction term significantly changed the 
model, Wald χ² (1, N = 200) = 3.19, p = .048, see Figure 7. To investigate this interaction the 
victim stories were analyzed separately depending on if victim statistics were presented. 
There was a significant main effect of victim story without a statistics box, Wald χ² (1, n = 
100) = 5.20, p = .023, Exp(B) = 3.17.6 This indicates that among the participants that only 
read the victim stories, the probability of donation was higher for 1IV compared to 9SV. This 
effect seemed to be reversed when presenting victim statistics, see Figure 7, but the effect 
was non-significant, Wald χ² (1, n = 100) = .23, p = .63, Exp(B) = .79. In summary the 
analysis indicates a higher probability of donating for 1IV compared to 9SV. However, when 
the victims are presented together with victim statistics this effect dissipates. The magnitude 
if donating (0-3 lottery tickets) was highly non-parametric and not included in the analysis, 
for means see the second graph of Figure 7. 
                                               
6 The*significance*here*refers*to*that*the*model*was*significantly*different*when*the*interaction*term*was*
entered.*The*odds*ratio*is*not*reported*since*it*is*a*odds*ratio*of*odds*ratios*that*is*practically*unrelatable*to*the*
measurement. 
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Figure'7.*Percentage*of*participants*that*elected*to*donate*1M3*lottery*tickets,*and*means*(magnitude)*of*
donations*in*lottery*tickets*for*victim*stories,*and*if*a*statistics*box*were*presented.*Error*bars*represent*
standard*errors*of*the*mean.*
 
The relation between anticipated warm glow, help intention and donations. To 
explore relations between anticipated warm glow and help intention depending on group, the 
data were split and anticipated warm glow was correlated with help intention and donations, 
see Table 2. The data did not replicate Study 1, there was no expected stronger relations for 
1IV compared to 9SV. However, the relations between anticipated warm glow and donations 
did show a result that was in line with hypothesis. Here only the donations for 1IV was 
related to anticipated warm glow, whereas the relation to donations towards 9SV was not 
significant. This is in line with expected results since it was hypothesized that judgments on 
help efforts for specifically 1IV would be more dependent on anticipated warm glow, see 
Table 4. 
 
Table*4.**
Correlations'between'anticipated'warm'glow'and'help'intention'+'donation,'in'Study'2.'
* 1*identified*victim* * 9*statistical*victims*
Measure* No*statistics* Statistics*box* * No*statistics* Statistics*box*
Help*intention* .46*** .53*** * .74*** .55***
Donations* .42*** .40*** * .49* .17*
'Note***p*<*.001*
*
Summary 
 Both the replication of findings for anticipated warm glow and help intention from 
Study 1 failed, this means that the findings in Study 1 are less robust than expected. The 
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identifiable victim effect was not replicated using help intention, but the identified victim 
effect was found using real donations and only when no victim statistics were presented. 
 In regards to pseudoinefficacy fewer participants donated to 1IV when victim 
statistics were presented, but this difference was not significant. The interaction between 
victim story and victim statistics was primarily driven by a higher numbers of donations for 
9SV presented with victim statistics. Anticipated warm glow was not significantly related to 
donations for 9SV, so there is no clear indication in this study what is causing this new effect. 
As expected, anticipated warm glow was more strongly related to donations for 1IV. The 
failed replication of Study 1, and the successful partial replication with real donations will be 
discussed in the general discussion. 
General discussion 
These two experiments demonstrated that both the specific context relevant for 
donating (victim story) and the broader context of the conflict (victim statistics) impact 
judgment for charitable aid. For specifically 1 identified victim, anticipated warm glow 
followed a similar pattern as help intention and showed stronger correlations. These studies 
suggest that changes in anticipated warm glow, when victims that cannot be saved are salient, 
might be one underlying factor for pseudoinefficacy. These experiments also suggest that 
pseudoinefficacy might be constrained to small numbers of identified victims. 
The identified victim effect was not significant but tendencies in line with this effect 
were demonstrated for both help intention in Study 1 and donations in Study 2. This was in 
line with Hypothesis 1. 
Pseudoinefficacy was replicated, but only for 1 identified victim. Victims that could 
not be saved led to lower help efforts for specifically 1 identified victim. There was no 
identified victim effect when victim statistics was presented. In contrast help efforts increased 
for 9 statistical victims, a new effect that will be discussed in more detail. This was in line 
with Hypothesis 2. In addition, in the mixed between-within group analysis there was no 
decrease in help intention when being exposed to victim statistics. The joint evaluation of 
victim stories was not affected by victim statistics. 
Anticipated warm glow was lower overall when presenting victim statistics in both 
experiments. However, the only significant difference was in Study 1 for specifically 1 
identified victim, which is in line with Hypothesis 3. 
In Study 1, help intention and anticipated warm glow had a slightly stronger relation 
for the groups that faced 1 identified victim compared to the group that faced 9 statistical 
victims. This was not replicated in the follow up. However the relation between anticipated 
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warm glow and donations was significant when facing 1 identified victim and not for 9 
statistical victims, which is in line with Hypothesis 4. 
Theoretical implications 
 To discuss some of the implications of this thesis, I will present two studies from prior 
research that failed to find the identifiable victim effect. The first study was measuring 
differences in anticipated warm glow and the intention to help for one identifiable victim 
compared to statistical victims. The different victim types were presented using a bone 
marrow donation context, and the donation procedure was described as: “A bone marrow 
transplant is somewhat painful and unpleasant for the donor, a thick needle is inserted in the 
lower back, but there are no major risks for the donor”. This unpublished paper found no 
significant differences for anticipated warm glow or help intention between-subject 
(Johansson & Sundfelt, 2014). 
The second study was a large field experiment (N = 25000) conducted on a sample of 
registered humanitarian aid donors in Denmark. Letters presenting either two identified 
victims (one on each side of the letter) or statistical victims were sent out to prior donors; 
these real donation pleas concerned starving children in Ethiopia. The outcome variable was 
donations using the form included in the letters. Furthermore, the letters presenting the 
identified victims included this text: “Right now a hunger catastrophe is threatening the lives 
of 12 million people in the Sahel region. We can do something if we act now. You can 
therefore also help us ensure that the situation does not become as severe as the one we saw 
on the Horn of Africa in 2011”. The letter also included illustrations of brains with 
descriptions of how hunger breaks down the brains of children. No differences in donations 
were found (Lesner & Rasmussen, 2014). 
I argue that both these studies failed to find any effect because of a decline in 
anticipated warm glow in the identified victim conditions. This decline was primarily caused 
by the additional negative affective information presented alongside the victims. More 
specifically: the first study presented a possibly painful donation procedure, and the second 
study presented statistical information reminding the participants of all other potential victims 
they cannot help. Lesner and Rasmussen (2014) compared donations between identified 
victims and statistical victims. This thesis demonstrated that manipulating only the victim 
type without carefully controlling other contextual information constraints the identifiable 
victim effect. The additional information made it hard to anticipate warm glow for donating, 
and subsequent intentions to donate, or real donations declined to the same level as the 
statistical victim group. 
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 Proportional reasoning vs. affective evaluation. One idea behind what drives the 
identified victim effect is proportional reasoning (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). When 
deciding to intervene on the behalf of one identified victim, the decision affects 100% of 
(1/1) the victim reference group. For nine statistical victims the perceived proportion of 
victims helped might not be 100% (9/9), the reasoning here is that with increasing victim 
numbers, larger reference groups are made salient. So instead of 100% (9/9), all Syrian 
victims, or all starving children in the world might be a reference group, the proportion of 
victims helped suddenly is perceived as being 9 out of all children in need, far lower than 
100%. Västfjäll et al., (2014) demonstrated a decline in help efforts, even when the 
proportion of helped victims was relatively high, one out of two or 50% of victims were 
helped, a result that the authors deemed unlikely to be attributed as proportional reasoning or 
so called drop-in-the-bucket thinking. The proportion was actually lower for 1 of 2 victims 
compared to 1 victim in this specific experiment. In this thesis, to my knowledge for the first 
time, stronger evidence against deliberate drop-in-the-bucket reasoning was demonstrated. 
Drop-in-the-bucket thinking has been demonstrated for larger number of victims (Bartels, 
2006; Bartels & Burnett, 2011), the result of this thesis and the result of Västfjäll et al., 
(2014) indicates that smaller number of victims might be a constraint for this explanation. 
The statistics box used for both studies contained 11 million victims that were out of reach. 
The difference in proportion for one identified and nine identified victims compared to 11 
million victims is extremely small (.000001%). Help efforts did not decline for 9 statistical 
victims, in fact the opposite pattern emerged, where help efforts actually was higher for nine 
statistical victims presented with victim statistics. To further examine proportional reasoning 
for small numbers of victim, future studies could manipulate the size of the reference group 
(victim statistics) and if that information is more or less negative in valence. This could 
indicate how both negative affective information and proportional reasoning mediates help 
efforts. 
 Anticipated warm glow. In Study 1, victim statistics specifically led to lower 
anticipated warm glow when reading about one identified victim and not for nine statistical 
victims. Small et al. (2007) demonstrated a similar decrease in affect for one identified victim 
presented with victim statistics, but did not test the impact of statistics on any other victim 
type. Presenting victims that are out of reach for help had no effect on anticipated warm glow 
for helping nine statistical victims. The interaction between victim stories and presenting 
statistics did not reach significance. However a pattern emerged where changes in anticipated 
warm glow specifically affected a singular victim. Earlier descriptive evidence (Västfjäll et 
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al., 2014, 2015) suggests that the decrease in affect should be strongest for 1 identified 
victim, but there should still be some effect for all small numbers of victims. In these 
experiments there was no decline in anticipated warm glow for 9 statistical victims, this 
suggest that affective evaluation might be constrained to small numbers of specifically 
identifiable victims and not small numbers of statistical victims.  
 Prior research on the underlying mechanisms of pseudoinefficacy have only shown a 
decrease in unspecified affect for one identified victim when victims that cannot be helped 
are salient (Small et al., 2007; Västfjäll et al., 2014, 2015). This thesis suggests that more 
specific measures of affect should be used in experimentation. Slovic et al., (2007) 
introduced the affect heuristic with emphasis on judgment being made with the help of active 
emotion. The experiments in this thesis certainly cannot rule out that evaluating active 
emotion influence decision. However, what the experiments did show is that active emotion 
is not necessary for the evaluation to decrease for victims when affectively negative 
information is present. DeWall et al.,(2015) performed a meta analysis of active emotion vs. 
anticipated emotion as predictors for decisions. Experiments using anticipated emotion was 
clearly more successful, but the author also pointed out that experiments using anticipated 
emotion was scarce. This thesis adds to the few number of studies examining anticipated 
emotion impact on judgment. 
 Identified victim vs. statistical victims. As proposed by Hamilton and Sherman 
(1996), the single victim might be processed differently compared to the group of victims. 
The expectation of warm glow for donating towards the individual was significantly lower 
for the individual victim compared to the group of victims when facing the seriousness of the 
Syrian conflict. If individuals are processed more extensively, the participants might have 
given more effort to thinking about the consequences for the little girl than for the nine 
statistical victims. This might have led to lower anticipated warm glow when victim statistics 
were salient. In contrast, the anticipated warm glow did not change for the nine statistical 
victims, this might be caused by less effortful processing of the group. This is also in line 
with prior research that demonstrated that individuals in groups are perceived as having less 
beliefs, desires, consciousness (Morewedge, Chandler, Smith, Schwarz & Schooler, 2013). It 
is possible that the group of victims might have been processed more as objects, as some 
earlier evidence from neuroimaging supports (Van der Cruyssen, Heleven, Vandekerckhove 
& Overwalle, 2015). This could explain why anticipated warm glow did not change at all 
when participants was exposed to victim statistics. 
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 Possible explanations for increase in help efforts for nine statistical victims presented 
with victim statistics. In Study 1 help intention was higher for nine statistical victims when 
the participants were exposed to victims that cannot be saved. The same pattern, was seen for 
the donations in Study 2. The effect was in opposite direction of the prediction, and in 
measurements with similar numbers of identified victims (Västfjäll et al.,2015). It was 
hypothesized help intention would show some pseudoinefficacy for 9 statistical victims, with 
a weaker effect than for 1 identified victim. This new effect seems to be specific for low 
number of statistical victims when facing victims that cannot be saved, since this has not 
been measured before. One possible explanation is relative lower levels for 9 statistical 
victims without victim statistics, in this condition the participants were presented with the 
lowest amount of information: 1. Low levels of identifying information, 2. No background 
information. In the group reading victim statistics, the participants knew that the situation in 
Syria is very dangerous; they might have reasoned that any help is important in this crisis. 
However, this only makes sense if this reasoning was not dependent on evaluating affect (for 
example anticipated warm glow, but could also be other affective components). The 
correlation between anticipated warm glow and help intention was lower for 9 statistical 
victims, and in the second study there was no significant correlation between anticipated 
warm glow and donations towards 9 statistical victims. This could be an indication for this 
explanation, this is highly speculative and as mentioned earlier no causal claims can be made 
between anticipated warm glow and help efforts in any of the studies. Future studies should 
investigate if this explanation is viable by manipulating both how dangerous or large the 
conflict is and how much negative affective information that is presented, i.e. death, diseases 
compared to being in danger and mentioning no specific disease. This could possibly 
discriminate between affective and deliberate components.  
Limitations 
The failed replications in Study 2 can have a number of different explanations. The 
first and simplest one is that the results of Study 1 is a type I error. This could be case for the 
new effect, but is less feasible as an explanation for the patterns similar to the identifiable 
victim effect. The identifiable victim effect has been replicated many times in laboratory 
settings, in experiments similar to the ones used in this thesis. A similar pattern was also 
demonstrated in Study 2, but only for donations. The second explanation is that the sample 
was different in the replication, analysis indicated larger personal differences (variance) in 
Study 2, most items were less normally distributed and differences in reliability of anticipated 
warm glow and help intention was larger between groups. This explanation does however not 
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explain why the donation measure did replicate the result of help intention from Study 1. The 
third explanation is differences in experimental procedures. It was noted by the experimenter 
that participants spent almost as long time rating one ad in Study 2, as the participants spent 
rating three ads in Study 1. Increased incitements for participating in Study 2 might have 
increased analytical thought in all groups when rating the ad. Analytical thought was one of 
the interventions used in Small et al., (2007) besides presenting statistics. The effect size of 
the control variable for reading statistics was half the size in Study 2, something that also 
supports this explanation. Whereas rating the ad was no surprise for the participants, the 
donation of lottery tickets was, and a similar pattern as in Study 1 appeared. This might also 
accidentally lowered analytical thought, especially in the groups that were not exposed to 
victim statistics. Effect sizes also indicated that both studies were underpowered, which can 
increase the risk for both type I and type II errors. 
A potential problem in Study 2 was demand effects on the real donations after 
answering questions about donating first. This was not balanced to keep the participants 
unaware of the added donation measure. In designing Study 2, the partial replication of Study 
1 when rating the ad was prioritized. Ironically the failure to replicate the effects found for 
anticipated warm glow and help intention in Study 2, makes demand effects on the donation 
measure less probable. Since these measurements did not follow the same pattern as the 
donations, demand effects are less plausible. For instance, there were no differences on 
anticipated warm glow or help intention depending on victim type in Study 2, but there was 
an effect for donations. 
The result from the logistic regression performed for donations in Study 2 should be 
interpreted especially carefully. This result means that when the interaction term was entered 
into the model, the model significantly changed. The analysis was not intended for prediction 
of donations towards a specific victim type depending on if statistics was presented. The 
predictive power of the model is low. 
Is the help intention construct a good proxy for donations? In the help intention 
construct both measures of willingness to pay and attitudes for donating was aggregated. 
Research by Kahneman and Ritov (1994) demonstrated that willingness to pay is an attitude 
measurement; the difference is that the scale is in monetary value. Furthermore, attitude 
measures are related to actual payments (Brown et al., 1996, MacMillan et al., 1999).  
The experiments in this thesis also demonstrated similar patterns for help intention 
and donations. The donations of lottery tickets might also be considered an attitudinal 
measure since the value was relatively low, it can be argued that it is not a donation if 
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someone gives you value to donate. This is important critique; and there were economical 
limitations to how many resources that could be given to the participants. The budget for 
these experiments were limited, experiments with larger sums of resources would be a great 
addition to the knowledge about charitable aid. I argue that the lottery tickets donations 
together with willingness to pay and other attitudinal items inferences to charitable donations 
somewhat stronger. 
Ethics. In Study 2, the participants were not informed that they would be asked to 
donate from their compensation. This could be an ethical issue since the compensation for 
participation, without the knowledge of the participants, is at stake. This problem was 
considered and the donating decision was made as anonymous as possible by letting the 
participants end the study without meeting the experimenter, leaving the questionnaire in an 
answer box. However, this does only lower demand effect and does not remove them, there 
could still be demand characteristics or other social demand that pressured the participant to 
donate their compensation. 
In both studies the participants read information about death, disease, sick children. 
This could potentially sadden some of the more sensitive participants. However, the 
information presented in the studies is similar to what is presented by humanitarian aid 
organization or news outlets, this is arguably information that participants is exposed to in 
ordinary life. In addition, all participants were given the opportunity to be debriefed by the 
experimenter. 
Broader implications 
In 1995 a rhinoceros was born at the Kolmården Zoo in Sweden. The birth of 
“Nelson” was national news, unfortunately the creature died 10-days later of congenital brain 
defects. The Swedish Nelson-club wanted to create a memorial at the Zoo, however the Zoo 
was not interested. Members of the Nelson-club kept the ashes for five years, until they found 
a memorial (Svärdkrona, 2000). This single identified animal victim elicited help efforts from 
the Swedish public that many Syrian refugees only can dream about. 
Aid organizations often solicit for donations by presenting the singular victim with a 
background of the crisis, and Lesner & Rasmussen (2014) found this method ineffective 
when compared to only statistics in a large sample of former donors in Denmark. The 
identifiable victim effect has been taken for granted and used extensively in marketing, with 
no consideration of how additional statistics will impact the donations. The work of Västfjäll 
et al., (2014, 2015) and this thesis indicates that the victim in itself is not what creates the 
increased help for the singular victim, it is the affective evaluation of the singular victim. 
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When aid organizations are trying to evoke the need for aid by presenting factual information 
about disease, famine, death, they risk counteracting the positive emotions related to giving 
aid. How can I feel good about donating when millions are starving? How can I feel good 
about donating blood, if I believe I am going to feel nauseous? Aid appeals that target 
affective reasoning might benefit from a focus on anticipated warm glow by informing 
potential donors of how good you can feel by helping. For example, former blood donors 
actually feel good after donating and not particularly nauseous (Ferguson, Farrell & 
Lawrence, 2008). 
The victims of conflicts, like the civil war in Syria, receive almost one third of aid 
from from private donors. The amount of aid is highly unstable from year to year, private 
donations are estimated to increase or decrease by as much as 50% (Global humanitarian 
assistance, 2014). The information about conflicts that are reaching the public might be 
causing this volatility. Affectively loaded narratives might be effective for raising aid in the 
short-term, but when combined with news reports the help efforts might be lower than 
baseline. The newly found effect in this thesis might be an important first step to increase aid 
for statistical victims, where the victim story carries less affective information and more 
knowledge about the seriousness of the crisis seem to increase help efforts. Less affective 
reasoning might be a key to helping large groups of humans.  
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Appendix A 
Additonal results from Study 1 and Study 2 
Table*A1.**
Mean'and'standard'deviation'for'the'betweenHgroup'dependent'variables'in'Study'1.'
* 1*identified*victim* * 9*statistical*victims*
* No*statistics* * Statistics*box* * No*statistics* * Statistics*box*
Measure* M' SD' ' M' SD' ' M' SD' ' M' SD'
Warm*glow* 4.49* 1.38* * 4.21* 1.34* * 4.38* 1.37* * 4.34* 1.39*
Happiness* 4.37* 1.42* * 3.66* 1.31* * 4.32* 1.49* * 4.30* 1.44*
Good*person* 4.16* 1.25* * 3.89* 1.26* * 4.30* 1.41* * 4.10* 1.35*
Probability* 3.66* 1.46* * 3.01* 1.41* * 3.19* 1.30* * 3.18* 1.50*
Motivation* 3.73* 1.40* * 3.38* 1.38* * 3.47* 1.15* * 3.62* 1.51*
Hyp.*Donation* 2.66* 1.33* * 2.06* 1.11* * 2.45* 1.43* * 3.04* 1.77*
Aid*org.** 4.32* 1.11* * 4.15* 1.17* * 3.91* 1.26* * 4.21* 1.34*
*Perception*of*the*aid*organisation*responsible*for*the*ad.*
*
Table*A2.**
Means'and'standard'deviation'for'betweenHgroup'dependent'variables'in'Study'2.'
* 1*identified*victim* * 9*statistical*victims*
* No*statistics* * Statistics*box* * No*statistics* * Statistics*box*
Measure* M' SD' ' M' SD' ' M' SD' ' M' SD'
Warm*glow* 4.44* 1.46* * 4.10* 1.50* * 4.60* 1.68* * 4.30* 1.36*
Happiness* 4.22* 1.49* * 3.92* 1.44* * 4.34* 1.89* * 4.14* 1.50*
Good*person* 3.92* 1.18* * 3.92* 1.37* * 4.56* 1.62* * 3.92* 1.26*
Probability* 3.64* 1.44* * 3.06* 1.28* * 3.38* 1,58* * 3.20* 1.43*
Motivation* 3.86* 1.37* * 3.38* 1.44* * 3.78* 1.84* * 3.64* 1.51*
Hyp.*Donation* 2.72* 1.41* * 2.62* 1.81* * 2.70* 1.78* * 2.18* 1.30*
Aid*org.** 4.10* 1.20* * 4.20* 1.20* * 4.42* .99* * 4.50* 1.05*
*Perception*of*the*aid*organisation*responsible*for*the*ad*
*
*
*
Figure'A1.*Analysis*of*Attitude*towards*the*help*organisation*behind*the*ads*relation*to*Help*intention*using*the*
Preacher*and*Hayes*(2008)*mediation*macro*for*SPSS.**
Statistics x Victim story Help intention
B = -.567 (.255), p = .0268
Attitude towards help org.
Statistics x Victim story Help intention
B = -.770 (.283), p = .0068
B = .4368 (.0519), p < .001B = -.4654 (.2874), p =.106
c'
ba
c
Study 1, N = 291, Full model: F(2, 288) = 39.973, p < .001, R2(adj)= .217
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Figure'A2.*Analysis*of*Attitude*towards*the*help*organisation*behind*the*ads*relation*to*Anticipated*Warm*Glow*
using*the*Preacher*and*Hayes*(2008)*mediation*macro*for*SPSS.**
 
 
Figure'A3.*Means*for*anticipated*warm*glow*and*help*intention*towards*1*identified*victim,*9*identified*victims,*
and*9*statistical*victims*for*the*group*presented*with*a*statistics*box*and*for*the*no*statistics*group,*separated*
for*order*of*presentation*indicated*by*arrows.*Error*bars*represents*standard*errors. 
 
 
 
 
Statistics x Victim story Anticipated warm glow
B = -.257 (.274), p = .348
Attitude towards help org.
Statistics x Victim story Anticipated warm glow
B = -.457 (.299), p = .127
B = .4288 (.0558), p < .001B = -.4654 (.2874), p =.106
c'
ba
c
Study 1, N = 291, Full model: F(2, 288) = 30.979, p < .001, R2(adj)= .171
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Appendix B 
Materials 
 
 
Figure'B1.*Ads*for*1*identified*victim,*9*identified*victims,*and*9*statistical*victims*used*in*Study*1*and*Study*2.*
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Figure'B2.*Dependent*variables*for*all*studies*and*lottery*ticket*donation*measure*used*in*Study*2.*The*materials*
are*translated*from*Swedish*to*English.*
Instructions
When you have answered all of the questions, turn the page to the next 
spread.
IMPORTANT! You should not go back in the questionnaire.
Questions about the ad
I would experience an extremely strong feeling of warm glow if I donated money to the nine 
children in this specific case.
I would feel extreme happiness if I donated money to the nine children in this specific case.
I would experience myself as a extremely good person if I donated money to the nine children 
in this specific case.
How probable is it that you would donate money to the nine children in this specific case?
How motivated would you be to donate money for the nine children in this specific case?
Imagine that you would win $100 in a lottery, how much of the prize would you donate to the 
nine children in this specific case? 
If a humanitarian aid organization used this specific ad, how would you perceive the 
humanitarian aid organization?
How many facts do you experience that this particular ad contains?
Not good person at all Extremely good person1 2 3 4 5 6 7Good person
No happiness at all Extreme happiness1 2 3 4 5 6 7Happiness
No warm glow at all Extreme warm glow1 2 3 4 5 6 7Warm glow
Not motivated at all Extrmely motivated1 2 3 4 5 6 7Motivated
Not probable at all Extremely probable1 2 3 4 5 6 7around 50% probable
$0 $1001 2 3 4 5 6 7$50
Extremely negative Extremely positive1 2 3 4 5 6 7neutral
Extremely few Extremely many1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Instructions
You can now elect to donate some or all of the lottery tickets you received as 
compensation for your participation.
Place the number of lottery tickets you chose to donate for the nine children in 
the envelope at the bottom of the page.
The value of the lottery tickets will be transfered to Save the Children when 
the study is concluded. Every lottery ticket is worth $1. Contact Xxxx Xxxx at 
email@email.com if you want to receive a receipt of the donation.
Your decision to donate is anonymous, you will not have to explain your 
decision, or meet the experiment leader when you have completed the 
questionnaire.
Kindly, glue the envelope together after you have made your decision. To 
ensure anonymity its important that you glue the envelope together regardelss 
of what decision you will make.
How much money do you choose to donate for the nine children? 
-Check the box that represents your decision.
 I donate $0 (put 0 lottery tickets in the envelope)
 I donate $1 (put 1 lottery ticket in the envelope)
 I donate $2 (put 2 lottery tickets in the envelope)
 I donate $3 (put 3 lottery tickets in the envelope)
